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L
The total number of the child attributes.
M
The total number of linguistic variables used to describe the X k child attribute.
N
The total number of linguistic variables used to describe the parent attribute.
F A logical function representing the relationship between A i k and D j .
 i,j k
The belief degree to which D j is believed to be the parent attribute if the k th child attribute is only described by the i th linguistic variable.
w k
The weight of the k th child attribute in the X-Y link.
The subjective probability of the input information from real observations belonging to A i k .
 j k
The belief degree to which D j is believed to be the parent attribute if the input satisfies the k th child attribute linguistic vector A i k (iM).
The probability mass unassigned to any individual output variables D j , when synthesising  j k (kL).
H S u
The utility values of S H .
RI
Failure ranking index.
INTRODUCTION
The growing technical complexity of large engineering systems, together with the intense public concern over their safety has stimulated the research and development of novel risk analysis and safety assessment procedures. However, the process of developing cost-effective, timely and flexible risk assessment methods for complex and large engineering systems has been the subject of considerable debate in recent years. It is mainly due to the fact that modelling and analysing complex risk scenarios increasingly needs to acquire the historical failure data/information as sufficient and precise as possible and to treat relevant uncertainties as flexible and comprehensive as possible.
It may be difficult to use typical safety assessment approaches such as a probabilistic risk assessment approach in situations where there is a lack of information and past experience, or in ill-defined situations in risk analysis [26] . Under prevailing circumstances, little numerical data of any statistical significance may be available to sufficiently support traditional "objective" risk analysis in complex engineering systems. For example, to analyse system safety in the design and operation of large offshore installations with a high level of innovation, it is highly possible that there is a lack of historical failure data. The uncertainty encountered in such engineering system safety analysis does not fit the axiomatic basis of probability theory. It is usually caused by not only randomness but also the inherent fuzziness of parameters and the incompleteness of input.
In engineering safety analysis, fuzziness exists due to ill-defined concepts in observation, or the inaccuracy and poor reliability of instruments used to make observations [14] . Incompleteness may be caused due to weak implication which occurs when an expert is unable to establish a strong correlation between premise and conclusion [14] . This means that intrinsically vague information may coexist with conditions of "lack of specificity" originating from evidence not strong enough to completely support a hypothesis but only with degrees of belief or credibility [3] , [37] .
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One realistic way to express fuzziness is to employ subjective/linguistic assessment based on fuzzy set theory (FST) [5] . One of the most popular fuzzy logic approaches is developed based on the fuzzy IF-THEN rules, where conditional parts and/or conclusions contain linguistic variables [41] . It can model the qualitative aspects of human knowledge and thus does not require an expert to provide a precise point at which a risk factor exists. This actually provides a tool for working directly with the linguistic information, which is commonly used in representing risk factors and carrying out safety assessment [1] , [2] , [9] , [13] , [18] , [21] , [25] , [28] , [29] , [33] . The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence [8] , [20] based on the concept of belief function is well suited to modelling subjective credibility induced by partial evidence [23] . Based on the D-S theory, an Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach [32] , [35] has been developed to describe and handle uncertainties using the concept of the degrees of belief, which can model incompleteness and ignorance explicitly. The kernel of this approach is an ER algorithm, which requires modelling the narrowing of the hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence [35] . The approach shows great potential in multiple attribute decision making (MADM) under uncertainty and its wide applications have been documented in the literature [15] , [21] , [24] , [29] , [34] , [35] .
In recognition of the need to handle the hybrid of both fuzziness and incompleteness in complex engineering system safety, it may be desirable and beneficial to extend the fuzzy logic framework to cover credibility uncertainty based on FST and ER. The benefit of combining fuzzy logic and belief models may become substantial when a lack of specificity in data is prevalent [13] . Several studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between fuzzy sets and D-S theory and suggest different ways of integrating them [7] , [10] , [17] , [30] , [31] , [33] . Based on fuzzy logic and ER, a generic Rule based Inference Methodology using the Evidential Reasoning (RIMER) has been proposed [33] and applied to engineering system safety analysis [13] , [14] . The model is designed on the basis of a fuzzy rule base with a belief structure. Such a rule base can function on the solutions of the non-linear causal relationships as well as incompleteness and 7 vagueness associated with risk parameters/decision attributes. It can be presented as a belief rule expression matrix, which forms a basis in the inference mechanism of RIMER and provides a framework for representing expert knowledge in a compact format [33] . The feature of the rule base (the difference from the original IF-THEN rule bases) lies in the fact that the rules include various belief degrees distributed into the multiple linguistic variables of the conclusion attribute. The main advantage of using belief degrees is to capture uncertainty and non-linear casual relationships in safety assessment. However, such a merit could also lead to some debates. The corresponding complex uncertainty inference may be not friendly enough to mathematically unsophisticated users. A Fuzzy Rule-based Bayesian Reasoning (RuRBaR) approach was developed to simplify the uncertainty inference of belief rule bases [37] . However, this approach, like RIMER, still needs to construct and establish the complex rule bases, which may be error-prone. There is a high possibility to assign incompatible belief degrees in a fuzzy rule base when a large scale scheme with hundreds of rules is defined entirely subjectively. "Incompatible" means contradictory belief degree distributions in two/more relevant rules, in which one rule which should have a better risk evaluation has actually been assigned belief degrees presenting a worse safety level. For example, in the safety rule base developed by Liu et al. [13] , [14] , Rule 85 and Rule 86 with their IF parts as the sets of {"reasonable low" failure occurrence likelihood (L), "moderate" failure consequence severity (C), "highly unlikely" failure consequence probability (P)} and {"reasonable low" L, "moderate" C, "unlikely" P} have been assigned their THEN parts as the sets of {(0.5, "good"), (0.5, "average"), (0, "fair"), (0, "poor")} and {(0.6, "good"), (0.4, "average"), (0, "fair"), (0, "poor")}. Furthermore, when new attributes are identified in the IF parts, it may be difficult to update the original rule base and to produce the output without the reestablishment of the whole fuzzy rule base systems.
This paper proposes a novel Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) approach, being capable of eliminating the "incompatible" belief degree distributions in traditional fuzzy IF-THEN rule based risk assessment methods 8 while making subjective risk assessment more rational and visible. The new method is generated by extending the RIMER approach on the basis of the combination of several different theories and techniques, such as the FST [40] , an AHP technique [19] and the ER approach [36] , etc. It shares the same philosophy with the divorce approach in Bayesian networks [11] , showing its superiority in modelling incompleteness of subjective judgement and accommodating additional attributes compared to the RIMER. The main feature of the new method is first to analyse the conditional belief degree distributions of the parent (conclusion) attributes given the individual child (antecedent) attributes in a fuzzy hierarchical link, then use all conditional belief degree distributions as an effective link to transfer input (based on child attributes) to output (based on a common parent attribute) and finally synthesise all output together using the ER approach.
By doing so, the complex work of constructing fuzzy rule bases can be replaced through establishing relatively straightforward fuzzy link diagrams. Contributions drawn from such a generic method are examined by a case study of collision risk between a floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) unit and a shuttle tanker due to technical failure during a tandem offloading operation. It can be applied to facilitate subjective risk assessment in different sectors when subjective data collection is needed for risk prioritisation of the identified hazards in engineering systems.
EXPERT SYSTEM STRUCTURE BASED ON THE NEW FUZZY EVIDENTIAL
REASONING
The generic structure of fuzzy link based expert systems is described in this section. Being the extension of fuzzy rule based systems, fuzzy link based expert systems can be generally considered as a multiple attribute decision making tool. The starting point for investigating a fuzzy link based system is to construct a hierarchy of representing the relationship among all decision attributes from the lowest level to the top one.
A knowledge base and an inference engine are then designed to infer useful conclusions from observable facts. Unlike rule based systems, the knowledge base is presented by belief links between a single pair of 
To capture the non-linear relationship between decision attributes X k (k = 1, …, L), the ER approach [32] , [36] is used to combine all output  j k (j = 1, …, N; k = 1, …, L) associated with X k and generate final conclusions.
The window-based and graphically designed intelligent decision system (IDS) has been developed based on the ER approach [35] , which facilitates the combination [14] . Having represented belief degrees  j k transformed from input for each decision attribute X k , the ER approach can be directly implemented as follows. First, transform the degrees of belief  j k for all j = 1, …, N, k = 1, …, L into basic probability masses using the following equations [14] , [32] , [36] .
where is generated as follows [14] .
, and {D j }:
where D  represents the remaining belief degrees unassigned to any D j .
USE OF THE NEW FER TO SUBJECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
The proposed framework for modelling system safety consists of eight major steps required for subjective risk analysis using the FER approach.
Identify the attributes of risk analysis (associated with X and Y).
2. Establish a hierarchy to represent the relationship between the attributes (related to w).
Define the linguistic variables used to describe the attributes (associated with A and D).
4. Construct a fuzzy link base with belief structures (associated with F and ).
Input transformation (associated with p)
6. Reasoning mechanism based on an ER algorithm.
7. Risk ranking 8. Validation using benchmarking.
Each step of the framework is described in detail in the following sections.
Step 1: Having stated the framework above, the first step to develop a general risk analysis model is to identify appropriate risk attributes. After the study of traditional quantitative risk methods like failure modes, and effects (FMEA) analysis, it can be seen that there are three basic attributes -failure likelihood (L), consequence severity (C) and failure consequence probability (P) (i.e. the probability that possible consequences happen, given the occurrence of the failure), which are used in assessing the safety (S) associated with each failure mode of a component and in determining safety level of a whole system [13] , [14] , [29] .
Step 2: As a result, a hierarchy to represent the relationship between the three basic risk attributes and the safety level of a complex engineering system (and its components) can be developed and shown in Figure 1 .
It has several levels and the three basic attributes at the bottom level. In such a hierarchical structure, it is usually the case that risk analysis at a higher level makes use of the information produced at lower levels. It is therefore important to synthesise the evaluations of the risk attributes and the components with appropriate weight distributions (between them) so as to obtain the risk estimation of the whole system. When considering a group of attributes for evaluation, an AHP technique can provide judgements on the relative importance of these attributes and also to ensure that the judgements are quantified to an extent, which permits a quantitative interpretation of the judgement among these attributes [18] . Using an AHP technique to calculate the relative importance of each attribute has been well accepted and evidenced by many publications and applications in the literature [26] and thus, it is used to calculate the weight distributions between the parameters and components in the hierarchy.
13 Figure 1 . A hierarchical diagram of system safety analysis [29] Step 3: Using fuzzy linguistic assessments allows the representation of information in a natural and adequate form when it is difficult to express the information with precision. It is commonly used by human experts to represent risk factors in risk analysis [2] , [13] , [14] , [18] , [21] , [28] , [29] . The linguistic variables for describing each attribute are decided according to the situation of the case of interest. The literature survey indicates that the linguistic variables and their membership functions used to describe L, C and P of a particular item may be defined on a unified utility space, in which 0 indicates the lowest risk contribution and 10 means the highest risk contribution [22] , [28] , [29] , as shown in Table I . 
(6.5, 7, 9.5) (7, 9, 9.5) (9, 9.5, 10) Consequence (C) Step 4: This step is to establish the belief links between each risk attribute's linguistic variables (L I , C J , P K ) and the variables (S H ) used to describe the safety levels of failure modes and the whole system. Generally, the belief degrees between the variables can be assigned based on multiple expert judgements. In this process, a fuzzy mapping approach based on utility theory is used with reference to the work by Li and Liao [12] to assist in obtaining the belief degrees. The philosophy of the approach is to calculate the belief degrees by referring to the comparison of the similarity between the fuzzy membership functions on a common utility (risk contribution) space of the linguistic variables, which are used to describe a pair of child-parent attributes (e.g. L and S). Specifically speaking, it can be symbolised as follows. u is calculated using Eq. (5) due to its simplification [12] , despite the availability of the other similarity degree measurement methods (e.g. distance-based).
If two membership functions are the same, that is Having defined the belief links between the linguistic variables of the three risk attributes and the safety levels of the failure modes, it is straightforward to identify the belief links between the safety levels of the failure modes, components, sub-systems and the whole system as follows.
where ' H S indicates the linguistic safety variables of the parent attribute and S H represents the linguistic safety variables of its child attributes.
Step 5: Before starting the safety analysis process, observations from experts should be analysed to determine their relationship with each (L, C, P) at the bottom level of the hierarchy. Four kinds of possible observations may be represented using membership functions to suit conditions under this study. They are either a single deterministic value with 100% certainty, a closed interval, a triangular distribution or a trapezoidal distribution [22] .
Having defined the membership functions of the three parameters as classical tool to set the matching degree between fuzzy sets [41] . Therefore, the subjective probabilities, I
L r p to which real observations belong to I L u can be defined as follows [13] . p so that their sum equals one.
Step 6: As a result, an appropriate five-level belief link based safety analysis model can be represented.
Using Eq. (2), all the input can be transformed into the relative output based on the linguistic variables S H of the safety level of the whole system at the top. The ER approach introduced in Eqs. (3) and (4) can be implemented to combine all the output and generate final conclusions, which are expressed using the four linguistic variables S H at the top level of the hierarchy.
Step 7: In order to rank the safety estimates expressed by S H , the fuzzy linguistic variables require to be defuzzified by giving each of them an "appropriate" utility value ( H S U ). Since the membership functions of
have been defined in Table I , H S U can be obtained using defuzzification methods such as a centroid approach [17] . Then, the ranking order index RI associated with system safety can be obtained by
where the numerical values of H  (H = 1, 2, …, 4) represent the belief degrees associated with the linguistic variables S H in the final output (safety level of the whole system) synthesised by using the ER approach.
Step 8: When a new method is developed, it requires testing to ensure its soundness. It may be especially important and desirable when subjective elements are involved in the methodology generated [38] . There are several well-accepted validation methods available before the methodology can be broadly accepted for use in practice. In this study, a benchmarking technique will be used to compare the FER method and the RIMER approach [13] , [33] through the analysis of their correlation.
A NUMERICAL STUDY OF AN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING SYSTEM
In order to compare with the well-established RIMER method, the case study in the work [13] is re-visited and investigated through the new FER method here. In this section, failure criticality analysis is carried out on risk introduced by the collision of a FPSO system with a shuttle tanker during tandem offloading operations. Only technical failure caused risk is assessed, though the operation failure has also been recognised as one of the major causes of collision. According to the literature survey, a technical failure that might cause collisions between the FPSO and a shuttle tanker during tandem offloading operations is a malfunction of the propulsion system. The four major causes to this technical failure are controllable pitch propeller (CPP), thruster (T), position reference system (PRS) and dynamics positioning system (DP) failures [6] .
As a result, a hierarchy to represent the relationship between the three basic risk attributes and the safety levels of a malfunction of the propulsion system (and its four failure modes) can be developed. Next, the weights of the three basic safety parameters and the four failure modes require to be calculated using an AHP method as follows [18] . After the fuzzy membership functions of all linguistic variables are acquired, the belief links between the basic parameters and the safety levels of failure modes may be calculated using the information of these variables. Generally, the evaluation of the belief links may be conducted in the common space of safety level S H , the sets described by the linguistic variables in Table I .
In order to evaluate
, it is desirable to use the fuzzy mapping technique in Eqs. 
In this way, fuzzy number C 2 can be transformed into the belief structure with the safety level expressions (S H , H = 1, 2, 3, 4) and shown in the following form. Having constructed the belief links, the next step is to calculate the input p i k from observations. It is assumed that each input parameter (L, C or P) will be fed into the proposed safety model in terms of any of the four input forms described in Step 5 of Section 3 to address different levels of uncertainty. In this case study, the same subjective data in [13] from a panel of five experts from different disciplines is used here, as the one shown in Table II for the failure mode CPP. The five experts include a technical manager of more than 20 years experience in the offshore industry from the UK HSE, a senior inspector of more than 20 years experience in the offshore industry from the UK HSE, a team leader of more than 20 years experience in the offshore safety sector from Shell, a senior engineer of more than 20 years experience in the offshore safety sector from Shell and a senior academic researcher of more than 15 working experience in marine and offshore fields.
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In order to conduct safety estimation using the new FER, the expert judgements obtained above are transformed into the forms, which can be accepted by the belief link based inference mechanism. Therefore, Eq. (8) and a normalisation process can be used to compute p i k , which is associated with L I , C J or P K , respectively. For example, Expert 1 used the triangular distribution input form to address the inherent uncertainty associated with the data and information available while assessing the three basic input attributes.
The failure consequence severity C is described triangularly as (7.5, 8.5, 9.5). Using the fuzzy Max-Min operation in Eq. (8), these input values are transformed and then normalised into the distributed representation on the linguistic variables as follows.
In a similar way, the following is obtained. Next, using Eq. (2) and Fig. (3) , such input can be transformed into output and expressed by S H (H = 1, 2, 3, 4) as follows. Based on such output, together with the weight set obtained above, the ER based IDS is used to implement the combination of the three pieces of output and generate the safety estimate for the propulsion system due to the failure CPP by Expert 1. The assessment result is generated as follows and shown in Figure 4 where the generated result is {0 S1, 0.0147 S2, 0.1858 S3, 0.7996 S4} This result can be interpreted in a way that the safety estimate of the propulsion system due to CPP by Expert 1 is "Average" with a belief degree of 0.0147, "Fair" with a belief degree of 0.1858 and "Poor" with a belief degree of 0.7996.
The similar computations are performed by the other four experts for CPP. The safety estimates generated for CCP by the five experts are summarised in Table III . Similarly, the safety estimates the propulsion system due to the other three potential failures (T, PRS and DP) can be calculated. Tables IVa -IVb show the results of   22 multi-expert safety synthesis on collision risk between the FPSO and a shutter tanker due to CPP, T, PRS and DP caused technical failure using the new FER approach respectively. The synthesis is carried out using both equal and different (i.e. {w E1 ; w E2 ; w E3 ; w E4 ; w E5 } = {0.3, 0.5, 0.9, 0.8, 1}) relative weights among the experts. 
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From Table V , it can be noted that for the two sets of weights assigned to the experts, the potential risk caused by CPP is always the highest and thus, it deserves more attention to reduce its potential risk to ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical). T is always ranked as the safest among the four failures and the potential risks caused by DP and PRS are ranked second and third, respectively. It is also noteworthy that the output with a small difference between the risk index values of the four failure modes reflects the similar input between the four failure modes from the five experts. The correlation between input and output may reveal that the model is sensitive and be capable of effectively dealing with the approximation associated with subjective judgement.
The benchmarking between the new model and the well-established RIMER method is also conducted to demonstrate the FER's reliability and unique characteristics. Because the two approaches are given the same fuzzy input in terms of subjective judgements, the final risk assessment results including safety estimates and ranking order should be kept in harmony to a significant extent in order to validate the feasibility of the proposed FER approach. According to [13] , the safety estimates with the contributions from all the failure modes and the risk ranking orders of the four modes with different expert weights are presented in Table VI . 
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Comparing Table IV (both IVa and IVb) and Table VI , it can be found that the highest belief degree is always assigned to the safety linguistic variable "Poor" while the combined belief degrees assigned to "Fair"
and "Poor" are more than 95% in both FER and RIMER methods. However, it is noted that the belief degrees assigned to "Fair" in the RIMER method is larger than the ones in the FER approach. This is mainly caused by the different ways of assigning belief degrees in the two studies. A sensitivity analysis has therefore been conducted to test the two ways (of degree distribution), with the result showing that impact of the input changes to the safety estimate in RIMER is inconsistent (sometimes irrational due to the incompatible rules involved) while it is always consistent in FER.
In terms of risk ranking, when the experts' weights are equally assigned, it has been shown that the four failures have been assessed and ranked in the same order in the two studies. When the experts are given different weights, the ranking orders of DP and PRS are different in the two studies. After a careful investigation, it has been disclosed that the difference ranking orders are caused by the different utility values assigned to the four safety linguistic variables H S U . It has been tested that if the same utility values are given, the ranking orders in the two cases will be identical. The above shows that the results obtained using the new FER and traditional RIMER are kept in harmony to a significant extent.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a fuzzy link based hierarchical group decision making framework for maritime system safety assessment. In the framework, the safety estimates of the basic events/failures are first carried out using a new FER approach, in which three belief link bases are developed to model the relationship between risk attributes, L, C, P and the failure safety level, respectively. The ER approach is then used to synthesise such estimates to obtain the safety assessment of the failure events and the one of the top level event in the form of linguistics expressions with belief degrees. Finally, such results are defuzzified through assigning 26 utility values to the linguistics expressions for risk ranking and prioritisation. Different from most conventional risk analysis methodologies, the framework introduced is characterised with a unique feature associated with unification of input and output data. In the safety analysis modelling, each input can be represented as a probability distribution on fuzzy linguistic values for the lower level attributes using a belief structure. The main advantage of doing so is that precise data, random numbers and subjective judgements with uncertainty can be consistently modelled under a unified form. The input data transformed by the linked fuzzy belief structures can be unified, taking into account subjective judgements with uncertainties of both probabilistic and possibilistic nature. Such advantages of the new approach are demonstrated by the results generated from a series of case studies on collision risk between a FPSO and a shuttle tanker. Furthermore due to its generality, the new approach is capable of offering an effective solution to tackling risk data with uncertainty in many engineering systems, including but not limited to those in offshore, marine and transportation sectors.
